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Abstract  
Carbon offset is one type of flexibility mechanism in greenhouse gas emission trading schemes that 
helps nations meet their emission commitments at lower costs. Carbon offsets take advantage of 
lower abatement cost opportunities from unregulated sectors and regions, which can be used to offset 
the emissions from regulated nations and sectors. Carbon offsets can also meet multiple objectives; 
for example, the Clean Development Mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol encourages Annex I countries 
to promote low carbon sustainable projects in developing countries in exchange for carbon offsets.  
 
Alternatively, the costs under cap-and-trade policies are subjected to uncertainties due to uncertainties 
about technology, energy markets, and emissions. There are several cost-containment instruments to 
address cost uncertainties, such as banking, borrowing, safety valve, and allowance reserves. 
Although carbon offsets are verified to reduce expected compliance costs by providing a surplus of 
cheap allowances that can be used by Annex I countries to help meet their commitments, they have 
yet to be studied as a cost-containment instrument. Carbon offsets could potentially be a cost-
containment instrument as purchasing carbon offsets during instances of high carbon price volatility 
could potentially provide some relief from high prices.  
 
This paper analyzes the effect of carbon offsets on carbon prices, specifically under carbon price 
uncertainty. I use carbon offsets from abatement activities that reduce emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation (REDD) as a case study example. My results show that carbon offsets reduce 
upside costs and thus can be an alternative cost-containment instrument, but cost-effectiveness can be 
limited by supply uncertainties, offset purchasing restrictions, emission target stringency and 
competition over demand. Carbon offsets, such as REDD, can serve as a flexibility instrument for 
developed nations, encourage global participation in reducing GHG emissions, and provide 
sustainable development support to developing nations. 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Mort Webster 
Assistant Professor, Engineering Systems Division 
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1. Introduction 
There is scientific consensus that increases in average global temperatures are very likely the 
result of increases in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, as reported in the 2007 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Synthesis Report (IPCC, 2007). Thirty-
seven countries have taken the initiative to regulate greenhouse gas emissions by ratifying the 
Kyoto Protocol. This agreement amounts to a 5 percent decrease in greenhouse gas emissions 
from 1990 level emissions during the 2008 through 2012 Kyoto Protocol compliance period.  
 
Although nations commit to targets, there are sectors and other nations that will remain 
unregulated due to political and administrative unattractiveness. The Kyoto Protocol implements 
several market-based mechanisms to encourage participation from these unregulated regions and 
sectors, specifically the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation 
(JI). CDM has a two-fold purpose; the mechanism provides incentives for sustainable 
development in developing countries and provides some flexibility for industrialized (Annex I) 
countries to meet their emissions targets. Under CDM, Annex I nations finance low carbon 
sustainable projects in developing areas and in exchange receive Certified Emission Reductions 
(CER), where one CER is equivalent to the a ton of equivalent carbon dioxide emissions 
reduced. These CERs can be credited into an Annex I carbon budget thereby making it easier to 
comply with an emissions reduction commitment. JI is similar to CDM, except that projects 
occur in regions categorized by the IPCC as ‗Economies in Transition‘ and Annex I nations 
acquire Emission Reduction Units (ERU) instead of CERs.  
 
CERs and ERUs from CDM and JI activities are the first application of carbon offsets 
instruments, where emission reduction activities that occur in unregulated regions and sectors 
generate emission allowances that can be used to offset Annex I emission targets. Carbon offsets 
are not limited to these mechanisms; many voluntary carbon offsets markets have been proposed 
or created such that companies and individuals can purchase reductions to offset their own 
emissions (MacKerron, et al., 2009).  
 
One major caveat to these offset mechanisms is that to maintain environmental integrity these 
emission reductions need to be additional to what would have occurred in the absence of the 
project; otherwise, projects would not actually contribute to actual emission reductions. Under 
CDM, every project is evaluated by the CDM Executive Board to show additionality and having 
measurable and verifiable emission reductions. There is some discussion of the establishment of 
a baseline, whether it truly captures the counterfactual: what happens without CDM and whether 
projects are attractive without CDM.  
 
Moreover, since the cost of undertaking these projects are cheaper than actual reductions, there is 
a concern that the carbon offsets will delay reductions or even increase emissions domestically. 
An assessment of the Kyoto Protocol, by Ellerman et al. (1998), shows that global costs of 
achieving Kyoto Protocol targets would drop from $120 billion to $54 billion if CERs are 
allowed and efficiently supplied. In addition, an EPA assessment of the proposed US Leiberman-
Warner bill (2008) shows that allowance prices would fall by 71 percent with unlimited domestic 
and international offsets.  As a result, carbon offsets have been criticized as potentially 
weakening the market price signal for carbon-intensive commodities, thereby reducing the 
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incentive to change consumption patterns for consumers in developed countries and reducing the 
incentive for industries to invest in low carbon technologies. In addition, since not all carbon 
offsets are the same, there is a concern that some offsets may produce carbon leakage by pushing 
carbon intensive operations in unregulated regions thereby weakening the integrity of emission 
reductions.  
 
The costs under emissions cap-and-trade policies are subjected to uncertainties due to 
uncertainties about technology, energy markets, and emissions, to name a few. Carbon price 
volatility can be particularly troublesome just as any other market. There are a number of cost 
containment mechanisms that address carbon price volatility, most commonly: banking and 
borrowing, safety valve, and allowance reserves. However, carbon offsets have yet to be studied 
as a potential cost-containment instrument. Carbon offsets are verified to reduce expected 
compliance costs by providing a surplus of cheap allowances that can be used by Annex I 
countries to help meet their commitments, thereby reducing expected costs of an emission 
reduction policy, as shown by the EPA assessment of the proposed US Leiberman-Warner bill 
(2008) and Ellerman et al. (1998). Therefore, using carbon offsets during instances of high 
carbon price volatility could potentially provide some relief from high prices; therefore, carbon 
offsets could potentially be a cost-containment instrument. Therefore, this paper will 
investigate whether carbon offsets can reduce carbon price volatility, specifically upside 
cost uncertainty; I will use deforestation reduction projects as a case study example, which 
are known as Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD).  
 
Deforestation is reported to account for approximately 20 percent of global greenhouse gas 
emissions, second to energy production and higher than those from the transportation sector.  
REDD aims to reduce emissions by reducing deforestation through an economic value placed on 
the carbon stored in forests; this provides incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions 
from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable development. This mechanism 
provides an opportunity to reduce GHG emissions and incentivizing sustainable development in 
these developing countries. Unfortunately, REDD activities are not currently considered valid 
CDM projects, due to disagreements over assignment of credits from carbon sinks in Kyoto and 
subsequent negotiations in The Hague (van‘t Veld and Plantinga, 2004). However, the REDD 
mechanism is considered to play an active role in the post-Kyoto framework based on the 
Copenhagen Accord (UNFCC COP 15, 2009). 
 
Using REDD as a case study example, this paper will show that carbon offsets exhibit cost 
containment properties, specifically reducing upside carbon price uncertainties. Therefore, 
carbon offsets, such as REDD, can serve as a flexibility instrument for developed nations, 
encourage global participation in reducing GHG emissions, and provide sustainable development 
support to developing nations. However, cost containment effectiveness is reduced with 
increased competition over demand for offsets and offset demand restrictions. In addition, REDD 
supply uncertainties further reduce cost containment effectiveness.  
 
REDD is analyzed through four different trading scenarios to illustrate the effect of competition 
on cost-containment effectiveness. In addition, I analyze the effect of offset demand restrictions 
on cost-containment effectiveness. The proposed American Clean Energy and Security Act of 
2009 (H.R. 2454, Waxman-Markey Bill) has provisions that limit the amount of offsets that can 
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be purchased by the US, specifically a limitation of 2 billion metric tons (bmt) of CO2 offsets are 
allowed per year, where 1 bmt CO2 offsets are from domestic sources and the rest are from 
international sources. Therefore, I examine the restricted demand case for the US, where it can 
only acquire 1 billion metric tons of REDD as laid out in the proposed Waxman-Markey Bill to 
examine the effect of demand restrictions.  
 
These trading and offset demand restriction scenarios will be explored both deterministically and 
stochastically. Deterministic analysis will show the effects of REDD on expected costs without 
cost uncertainty. Stochastic analysis will show the effects of REDD under cost uncertainty and 
determine whether REDD reduces upside carbon prices. In addition, two sets of REDD supply 
scenarios are tested stochastically; these supply scenarios represent high to low opportunity costs 
based on fast to slow deployment rates and high to low opportunity costs based on a fast 
deployment rate scenario. 
 
Chapter 2 provides background information on carbon offsets, REDD, and cost-containment 
mechanisms. Chapter 3 provides a motivational example for the research question: whether 
carbon offsets, such as REDD, do exhibit cost containment properties. Chapter 4 explains 
modeling, methodology, and respective assumptions. Results and discussion is provided in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
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2. Background 
2.1 Carbon Offsets  
In a GHG emission reducing policy, several flexibility mechanisms exist to help nations meet 
emission reduction commitments at lower costs. The two main mechanisms are emissions 
trading and carbon offsets. Emissions trading allow firms and nations to take advantage of 
cheaper abatement options within regulated sectors and regions; linked trading schemes can 
further expand the pool of available abatement options within linked regions. Carbon offsets 
allows firms and nations to take advantage of abatement opportunities from unregulated sectors 
and regions to offset their own emissions. Both mechanisms take advantage of the availability of 
cheaper abatement options in other regions and sectors thereby reducing the costs of complying 
with emission reduction targets.  
 
An early application of pollution offsets was in the Clean Air Act. The purpose of the Clean Air 
Act was to protect and improve the air quality in the United States through research and 
supporting state and local government efforts (EPA, 1963). Originally, the Clean Air Act (1963) 
had not allowed new emission sources in non-attainment areas, which were regions that had not 
met a specified ambient standard by the 1975 deadline.  Subsequently, due to concerns that this 
restriction would slow economic growth in these non-attainment areas, in 1976, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) amended the act to include an ‗offset-mechanism‘ 
provision; this allowed new emission sources to enter a non-attainment area, if they can offset 
their emissions from existing polluters. This provision essentially created the framework for 
carbon offsets (Stavins, 2004).  
 
The Kyoto Protocol incorporates multiple flexibility mechanisms, including emissions trading, 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), which operate similar 
to the offset-mechanism in the Clean Air Act by taking advantage of lower marginal abatement 
costs in different regions and sectors. GHG reductions occurring in Annex I nations generate 
Emission Reduction Units (ERU) which can be traded between Annex I nations per Article 6 of 
the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998). CDM and JI have additional objectives that aim to foster 
global participation, sustainable development, and increase mitigation opportunities. Since CDM 
projects occur in non-Annex I nations, the emission reductions from CDM projects undergo a 
certification process to ensure reductions are measurable, verifiable, and additional. This 
certification process generates Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), which can be used by 
Annex I nations to comply with their respective GHG emission targets. The emission reductions 
from CDM and JI that are traded with Annex I nations are carbon offsets.  
 
The use of carbon offsets reduces expected costs since Annex I nations can use CERs to help 
meet their emission reduction targets thereby reducing domestic GHG emission abatement 
efforts; since these allowances originate from unregulated sectors and regions, estimates of 
reductions in expected compliance costs are significant. The EPA analyzed the effect of offsets 
on the Climate Security Act of 2008 (S.2191, Lieberman-Warner Bill); it showed that expected 
compliance costs would fall 71 percent through the use of unlimited domestic and international 
offsets. In addition, EPA performed sensitivity analysis on offset limitations and showed that if 
international offsets are restricted to 15 percent of the compliance obligation, carbon prices 
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reduce by 26 percent. If international offsets are banned and domestic offsets are limited to 15 
percent of the compliance obligation, carbon prices increase by 34 percent and increase by 93 
percent when both international and domestic offsets are banned.  
 
Moreover, these large reductions in expected compliance costs can weaken price signals for 
consumers and firms to change behavior; high prices incentivize consumers to reduce energy 
consumption and firms to invest in new technologies. Tavoni et al. (2006) shows through an 
intertemporal optimization model that the introduction of forestry offsets reduce improvements 
by the energy sector and policy-induced change in clean technologies by two to three decades. 
Therefore, carbon offsets are criticized for delaying important early investments in clean 
technologies by relying on foreign emission reductions. 
2.2 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation 
According to the Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol, GHG emission reductions can be met through 
the management of carbon sources and sinks, where acceptable carbon sinks are defined under 
specific human-induced activities in the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector 
(UNFCCC, 1998). Under LULUCF, there are three accepted mitigation options: afforestation, 
reforestation, and deforestation avoidance (Watson et al., 2000; Asner et al., 2005). Afforestation 
involves the conversion of long-term non-forested land to forest; reforestation activities convert 
recent non-forest land to forest, and deforestation avoidance projects prevent the conversion of 
carbon-rich forests to non-forest land. These three mitigation efforts are expected to reduce total 
global greenhouse gas emissions by up to 25 percent (Niles et al., 2002; Barker et al., 2007). 
 
The Kyoto Protocol allows afforestation, reforestation and deforestation avoidance projects since 
1990 as options that can be used to help Annex I nations meet their commitments. However, the 
Protocol left out rules and guidelines defining eligible projects, reporting and verifiability 
methods, which were defined in subsequent Conference of Parties (COP) agreements following 
the Kyoto Protocol. In COP 6 held at Bonn, negotiators agreed on the basic principles to govern 
LULUCF activities and the definitions for afforestation, reforestation and deforestation. The 
agreements add the following eligible activities under Article 3.4: forest management, cropland 
management, grazing land management, and vegetation, subject to certain conditions 
 
(UNFCCC, 2002). Furthermore, CDM LULUCF activities are limited to afforestation and 
reforestation only (UNFCCC COP 7, 2001).  
 
According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), deforestation is 
defined as forest changes that contribute to loss of tree cover of at least 10 percent; forest 
degradation is the reduction of forest biomass from non-sustainable harvest or land-use practices 
(O‘Brien, 2000; Asner, 2005). FAO reports that forests account for about half of the global 
terrestrial carbon pool, and deforestation in tropical regions account for about 20 percent of the 
global greenhouse emissions (Houghton, 2005). Moreover, tropical forests store about 50 percent 
more carbon than non-tropical forests; these tropical areas fall outside the Annex I region, 
mainly Indonesia and Brazil, which under current deforestation rates accounts for about 80 
percent of annual Annex I emissions reduction targets (Corbera et al., 2009). Therefore avoided 
deforestation projects in these carbon-rich tropical areas would not be eligible to generate ERUs 
or CERs. Reductions in deforestation and forest degradation in these developing regions are 
collectively referred as REDD. 
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Estimates of mitigation potential from REDD range from 2.6 GtCO2e to 3.3 GtCO2e per year by 
2030 (Eliasch, 2008; Vattenfall, 2007; Stern, 2006). The uncertainties in mitigation potential 
from REDD poses an underlying problem for negotiators by complicating the determination of 
additionality and verifiability. These high-deforestation countries also have underlying 
infrastructure issues, as they lack leadership, secure property rights, resources and equipment, 
and government corruption exacerbates the effectiveness of support activities (Corbera et al., 
2009). In addition, deforestation reduction projects are in danger of non-permanence as forests 
can be both a carbon sink and source, depending on age, management, environmental conditions 
and disturbances that alter their composition (Watson et al., 2000; Rosenbaum et al., 2004; Dale 
et al., 2001). In addition, there are large uncertainties in GHG mitigation due to the variety of 
carbon sequestration potentials among different trees. These uncertainties create liabilities for 
verifiability of emission reductions and determining baselines for business-as-usual to ensure 
additionality. However, it has been argued that REDD can be more cost-effective than other 
mitigation options because it does not require the development of new technology, except for 
monitoring (Stern, 2006), and it can generate co-benefits such as employment, environmental 
conservation and poverty alleviation (Corbera et al., 2009). 
 
Some foreign assistance currently exists to address deforestation; however based on current 
rates, it is failing to significantly abate global deforestation. Recent studies estimate that to 
achieve a substantial reduction of emissions from deforestation, funds of at least $5 billion per 
year are needed. In contrast, the current level of funding from foreign assistance, as of March 
2009, totaled less than $1 billion (Corbera et al., 2009), is not enough to significantly curb 
deforestation-related emissions. In addition, a FAO Assessment reports that deforestation grew 
significantly between 1990 and 2005 with few signs of slowing down (Corbera et al., 2009). 
Moreover, existing deforestation policies (conservation policies and sustainable forest 
management) have not been effective due to insufficient staffing, poorly defined multi-
stakeholder and institutional arrangements, lack of management leadership and undermining 
political environments (Stoll-Kleeman et al., 2006). Therefore, current efforts to reduce 
deforestation have been unsuccessful; incorporating REDD into CDM can potentially provide 
these needed reductions. Current CDM transactions reported to generate about $50 billion to 
$120 billion per year, incorporating deforestation in a carbon market can provide sufficient 
funding to significantly reduce emissions from deforestation (Corbera et al., 2009).  
 
Moreover, funding cannot entirely solve the deforestation problem, as policy needs to address 
deforestation drivers directly in order for deforestation funding to be cost-effective. A 152-
subnational case study showed that for tropical deforestation, economic and policy/institutional 
factors play a major role in driving deforestation (Geist and Lambin, 2001). Drivers of 
deforestation vary from country to country (Tole, 1998) and effective policies and mechanisms 
should ensure that deforestation drivers are addressed and highly-deforested countries receive 
sufficient funding. In response to current deforestation-reducing activities and the need for 
further support of REDD efforts in developing countries, the Bali Action Plan encourages Annex 
I countries to support voluntary efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation through: capacity-building assistance, provide technical and technology transfer 
assistance, efforts to address deforestation drivers, and advance research on addressing 
methodological issues to ensure verifiability and additionality (UNFCCC COP 13, 2008). In 
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anticipation of incorporating REDD as a post-Kyoto mechanism, the UN-REDD Programme, in 
collaboration with UN Food and Agricultural Organization, UN Development Programme, and 
UN Environment Programme, was created to help REDD host countries prepare to participate in 
a REDD mechanism through national policies and involvement of all stakeholders.  
 
Currently, forestry offsets are not standard in all emission permit markets. Due to uncertainties in 
forestry projects and regional preferences to encourage clean technology investment, forestry 
credits are not accepted in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which is  
the largest emissions trading system in operation. According to the draft amendment of the EU 
ETS Directive published by the EU Commission, forestry credits will continue to be excluded 
from the EU ETS after 2012 (Streck et al., 2009). On the other hand, forestry credits are accepted 
in other smaller trading systems, such as the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement 
Scheme, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and the Chicago Climate Exchange 
(Streck et al., 2009). Due to limited market entry, forestry offsets have yet to provide real 
emission reduction benefits; therefore acceptance of  REDD in CDM, with sound policies and 
supporting infrastructure, can potentially further expand the availability of more GHG mitigation 
options and reduce deforestation and forest degradation. 
 
The UNFCCC created the framework to encourage activities that address the shortfalls of REDD 
implementation in Kyoto Protocol from the supply side to make REDD available for meeting 
commitments. On the demand side, studies have shown that carbon offsets further help reduce 
expected compliance costs. This paper aims to show that carbon offsets, such as REDD, can also 
address cost uncertainties for Annex I nations. 
2.3 Cost Containment 
In greenhouse gas emission reduction policies, the two policy instruments commonly discussed 
are a carbon tax (price) and cap-and-trade (quantity). In a deterministic scenario, where the costs 
and benefits of emission abatement are completely known, both instruments yield the same 
outcome, i.e., the same emission reductions at the same cost. Under uncertainty in abatement 
costs, a tax policy will have uncertainty in emissions. Conversely, a cap-and-trade policy will 
have uncertain carbon prices as there is no flexibility in emission targets.  
 
Uncertainty in costs and emissions play a vital role in the economy and environmental integrity. 
Uncertainty in carbon prices is troublesome as energy plays a vital role in any economy. 
Allowance prices could affect energy prices, the rate of inflation, and the value of goods and 
services, making investment decisions difficult (CBO, 2008). The causes of volatility can be 
attributed to the introduction of new technologies, energy efficiency gains, introduction of 
alternative sources of energy, and uncertainty about emissions; these sources can vary the cost of 
complying with a policy. Uncertainty in emissions is also a cause for concern as it can 
undermine emission target commitments and result in undesirable environmental complications 
from increasing emissions. Since greenhouse gases are a stock pollutant, GHG concentrations are 
based on accumulation of emissions over long periods of time; therefore, periods of high 
emissions can undermine long term GHG concentration objectives. Therefore, the policy 
instrument of choice can pose both environmental and economic implications. 
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Many studies validate the preference of a tax over a cap-and-trade policy for climate change. 
Most notably, Weitzman (1974), through a model, found that the relative shape of the marginal 
benefit and costs curves for pollution abatement determines the preference of one instrument 
over the other. He concluded that a price instrument is favored over quantity when marginal 
costs are steeper than marginal benefits. Pizer (2002), through Monte Carlo Simulations, 
demonstrates that climate change benefits are fairly linear thus justifying the preference for price 
policy in climate change policy. The basic reasoning is that because marginal benefits are flatter 
than marginal costs, changes in emissions would have a larger effect on costs than benefits; 
therefore, a price policy would be more advantageous. Moreover, the US Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) study, on Policy Options for Reducing CO2 Emissions (2008), finds that a tax 
policy absorbs price fluctuations and encourages firms to reduce further when marginal costs are 
low. Furthermore, when considering the effects of dynamics on cost and emissions, specifically 
correlation of cost shocks with time, discounting, stock decay, and rate of benefits growth with 
respect to welfare, Newell and Pizer (2003) show that a price can produce five times the welfare 
benefits of a quantity instrument when accounting for dynamic effects.  
 
Unfortunately, the US adoption of a carbon tax policy is politically unappealing due to the 
political aversion to tax policies. The US has a successful history with cap-and-trade policy in 
the Acid Rain Program, which created a system tradable of SO2 allowances. This bias towards 
cap-and-trade is evident in recent proposals and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
in the Northeast; therefore, there is a strong preference for cap-and-trade policies for greenhouse 
emissions.  
 
This preference for cap-and-trade policies makes the emission trading scheme vulnerable to price 
uncertainties. There are several cost containment instruments that can be implemented into a cap-
and-trade policy to address price volatility, such as banking, borrowing, safety valve, and 
allowance reserves. These instruments address different types of cost uncertainties, mainly short 
term and/or start up uncertainties; therefore, multiple instruments can be incorporated in any one 
policy (Webster et al., 2008a). 
 
Banking and borrowing add inter-temporal flexibility by allowing firms to bank current period 
allowances for future use or borrowing future allowances to use in the present. This can help 
reduce short term price volatility. A study by Fell et al. (2008) showed that the use of banking 
can reduce the welfare differences between a fixed cap-and-trade and carbon tax by 25 percent. 
Additionally, the effectiveness of a bank can be improved with the availability of a large bank or 
borrowing for the initial compliance year, as carbon prices are expected to have high volatilities 
during the policy‘s inception due uncertainties about abatement and low volume of allowances 
(Fell et al., 2008). These instruments allow firms to have more control over the management of 
their emissions over time. 
 
In addition, a hybrid (cap-and-trade and tax) instrument can potentially offer the benefits of both 
policies, while compensating for their shortfalls thus reducing total cost (Roberts and Spence, 
1976). This type of instrument needs to have considerable uncertainty in benefits as well as costs 
to be effective. A safety valve mechanism, which is considered to be a hybrid instrument, places 
a price ceiling on carbon prices, which controls for upside carbon price volatility. When carbon 
prices exceed the trigger or ceiling price, an unlimited amount of allowances are released into the 
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market and available until prices drop below the trigger or ceiling price. This mechanism is 
effective for short term of start-up uncertainties; it poses concerns for long term uncertainties, 
where availability of unlimited allowances can cause emission targets to be exceeded during 
periods of sustained high carbon prices. The effectiveness of a safety valve is dictated by the 
trigger price: a low trigger price essentially converts a cap-and-trade policy into a tax policy as 
the safety valve will likely be triggered more often than not; a high trigger price reduces the 
likelihood of triggering, and at the limit the policy is essentially a pure cap-and-trade. While the 
safety valve provides a relief from upside costs, a policy can also address downside costs risks 
by implementing a price floor, which would operate similarly to a safety valve. 
 
An allowance reserve is similar to a safety valve, but there are a limited amount of allowances 
entering the market when the trigger price is exceeded. This is mainly to address concerns that 
unlimited allowances will produce excessive amounts of additional emissions, especially when 
safety valve and banking are used concurrently. These two mechanisms can undermine 
environmental goals if firms can bank an unlimited amount of allowances when the safety valve 
is triggered, which would undermine reduction goals in future years. The allowance reserve 
mechanism would improve the effectiveness of a cap-and-trade policy under price uncertainty 
and make it politically attractive for environmentalists (Murray et al., 2008).  
 
In addition, linking policies between countries allows linked nations to achieve emission 
reductions cost-effectively. A major limitation of these instruments is that it can make linking 
trading schemes with other countries unattractive, especially for countries that do not allow these 
types of cost containment mechanisms. Linking makes these instruments available for every 
linked trading scheme regardless if it is or is not allowed in scheme. Furthermore, reductions in 
carbon prices can lead to concerns of reduced investment incentives due to expectations of lower 
carbon prices. 
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3.  Motivational Example 
In this section, I present a motivational example to illustrate the potential of carbon offsets as a 
cost containment mechanism.  
 
The costs of abating stock pollutants, such as greenhouse gas emissions, can be represented by 
the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve. It illustrates that abatement costs increase with 
increasing reductions since low cost abatement options are exhausted first. Figure 1 illustrates a 
representative MAC curve from Morris et al. (2008), which represents the US marginal 
abatement costs in 2050. We use this MAC curve for the motivation example.  
 
Carbon offsets can reduce compliance costs by reducing domestic reduction efforts. Since 
marginal costs rise quickly with increasing abatement, for a given offset amount, offsets can 
generate larger carbon price reductions for larger emission reduction targets than for smaller 
targets. If I consider a ‗US 50% policy‘ in 2050, this requires an abatement of 9132 million 
metric tons (mmt) of  CO2, which yields a carbon price of $109 per ton CO2 from Figure 1. If I 
assume US acquires 500 mmt CO2 of carbon offsets, which is relatively small relative to the 
target (5% of the target), the new target would be 8632 million metric tons; this yields a carbon 
price of $98 per ton CO2, which is an 11 percent reduction from the original target without any 
offsets. 
 
Figure 1. US 2050 MAC Curve (Morris et al., 2008) 
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, abatement costs are likely to be subjected to uncertainties for various 
reasons, such as uncertainties in abatement technologies, emission targets, and weather. These 
uncertainties will result in carbon price volatility. I will illustrate these effects in the MAC curve 
shown in Figure 1.  
 
First, I fit a polynomial curve to the MAC curve, in the form of y = Ax
3
 + Bx
2
 + Cx + D, to 
obtain an algebraic expression for the MAC curve. For MAC curve in Figure 1, the polynomial 
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fit is: -4E-11x
3
 + 2E-6x
2
 – 0.0031x + 0.9704. This polynomial fit shows that higher order effects 
beyond the second-order term may play a diminished role, as shown by the smaller coefficient 
value. 
 
I illustrate uncertainties in carbon prices by imposing a distribution on each polynomial 
coefficient (A, B, C, and D). For this example, I replace only one coefficient at a time with a 
distribution ranging from half to twice the nominal coefficient value. The same process is 
completed for the other coefficients, and I get a distribution of carbon prices as shown in Figure 
2 for each coefficient uncertainty.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of uncertainty on carbon prices. These figures overlay the nominal 
MAC curve with MAC at the upper and lower bounds of the imposed coefficient distribution. 
With an emissions reduction target of 9132mmt CO2 from above, uncertainties in coefficients A, 
B, and C produce high carbon price volatilities. In addition, the effect of the 500mmt CO2 carbon 
offset on carbon price varies over the coefficient distribution; this is mostly evident in 
‗Uncertainty in B‘ results, the reduction in carbon price is greater in the upper bound than the 
lower bound, as shown by the circles in each curve (dark-colored circle represents original target, 
light-colored circle represents new target with offsets). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. MAC curves with uncertainty bounds 
 
 
I further examine the role of carbon offsets under MAC uncertainties using Monte Carlo 
Analysis. Using the imposed probability distributions on each polynomial coefficient, I extract 
10,000 random samples from each coefficient distribution; these samples are used simulate 
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uncertainties in marginal abatement costs. For coefficient A, instead of the half to twice 
distribution, I imposed a normal distribution, with a standard deviation of 4E-11 since values 
under –1.81E-10 yield negative prices. Using these samples, I compare the distribution of carbon 
prices at the original target (9132 mmt CO2) and new target with the 500mmt CO2 carbon offset 
(8632mmt CO2).  
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Figure 3. Delta Carbon Price between Nominal and Respective Coefficient Uncertainty 
 
The carbon price reduction due to carbon offsets is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the 
distribution of carbon price reductions. The greatest reduction potential comes from the higher 
order terms, represented by coefficients A and B. The price reductions are greater for higher 
order terms meaning that the upper tail end of the carbon price distribution is reduced, reducing 
upside cost uncertainties. For this MAC, the offset has a larger effect on carbon price for the 
second-order term than the third order term; this result is unique to the MAC curve used as the 
third-order coefficient (-4E-11) is 4 orders of magnitude smaller than the second-order 
coefficient (2E-6).  
 
Therefore, small reductions in emission reduction targets from carbon offsets can potentially 
result in large reductions in carbon price. This is especially true for higher order uncertainties in 
the MAC curve. Therefore, this presents an opportunity for offsets, such as REDD, to reduce 
upside cost uncertainties. 
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4. Methodology 
In this chapter, I describe the framework and assumptions used to simulate the effect of REDD 
offsets. The analysis requires an assumption about the linked emissions trading schemes into 
which offsets would be traded, along with respective regional GHG emission commitments. In 
addition, the following REDD details are needed: quantity of REDD available (REDD supply), 
and REDD supplying regions with their respective business-as-usual baselines to ensure 
additionality.  
 
Moreover, as verified in the EPA study of the Lieberman-Warner bill (EPA, 2008) through 
restrictions on domestic and/or international offsets, offset scarcity impacts expected compliance 
costs; therefore, offset scarcity could also impact cost-containment. Scarcity is influenced by 
changes in the supply of and the demand for offsets. For REDD, supply is the amount of REDD 
credits allocated to these high-risk deforestation regions, and demand is the amount of REDD 
credits acquired by each region. Therefore, I analyze several limitations on the demand for and 
supply of REDD to determine the scarcity effects on cost-containment. 
 
I examine two factors that influence demand: competition (number of buyers) and offset demand 
restrictions. Competition increases overall demand for offsets thereby making offsets scarcer for 
all offset buyers, as the supply of offsets cannot compensate for the increase in demand. Offset 
demand restrictions are limitations on the amount of offsets allowed to enter an emissions trading 
scheme. I simulate competition by modeling four trading scenarios, with increasing number of 
REDD buyers, to represent low to high competition. In addition, I apply the 1 billion metric ton 
CO2 international offset restriction from the Waxman-Markey Bill (H.R. 2454) to simulate US 
offset demand restrictions.  
 
There are uncertainties that impact the allocation of offsets in each region, which can be 
influenced by a number of factors, such as certification and opportunity costs. I examine supply 
uncertainties based on opportunity costs and deployment uncertainties. I generate two alternative 
supply probability distributions representing the following two supply scenarios: (1) combined 
opportunity and deployment uncertainties, and (2) opportunity cost uncertainties based on fast 
deployment. I examine these two supply scenarios via Monte Carlo simulation; using randomly 
drawn samples from these two distributions, I analyze the two different supply scenarios with 
REDD to determine the effect of supply uncertainties on cost-containment. 
 
I model REDD both deterministically and stochastically. The deterministic results illustrate the 
effects of REDD on expected compliance costs under the different trading scenarios and under 
US offset demand restrictions. The stochastic analysis assesses REDD offsets on carbon price 
and supply uncertainties under the different trading scenarios and US offset demand restrictions. 
To model cost uncertainties, I use Monte Carlo simulation with 400 samples that are drawn from 
probability distributions for 110 EPPA model parameters that are found to impact emissions and 
cost. I simulate the effects of including REDD, under these cost uncertainties, for each of the 
different trading scenarios and US offset demand restrictions to determine whether REDD offsets 
exhibit cost-containment behavior and whether competition and offset demand restrictions limit 
cost-containment effectiveness. The supply uncertainties are assessed similarly to cost 
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uncertainties; I incorporate the samples drawn from the two supply distributions with the cost 
uncertainty samples and assess the different trading scenarios and US offset demand restrictions.  
 
I examine four trading scenarios with increasing competition, with the following designated 
REDD buyers: (1) US only; (2) Canada, Japan, European Union, Australia, New Zealand added; 
(3) China added; (4) All regions. I will refer trading scenario 2 as ‗Annex 1‘ even though it does 
not include all Annex 1 countries. 
 
I model the offset restrictions in the proposed American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 
(H.R. 2454, Waxman-Markey Bill) as the offset demand restriction scenario. The bill has a 
provision that limits domestic and international offsets to two billion metric tons (bmt) of CO2 – 
one bmt for domestic and the rest for international offsets; this can limit cost containment 
effectiveness as it artificially makes offsets scarce within the US.  
 
All scenarios described above are analyzed using a computational general equilibrium (CGE) 
model, MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) Model. The following sections 
will discuss the supply and demand assumptions and emission targets in further detail as well as 
how they are incorporated in the EPPA model. 
4.1 Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) Model  
I use Version 4 of the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model. The EPPA 
model is a CGE model developed by the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global 
Change. The EPPA model is a multi-region, multi-sector recursive-dynamic representation of the 
global economy (Paltsev et al., 2005). In a recursive-dynamic solution economic actors are 
modeled as having ―myopic‖ expectations.1  This assumption means that current period 
investment, savings, and consumption decisions are made on the basis of current period prices.  
 
The EPPA model is built on the GTAP dataset (Hertel, 1997; Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002), 
which accommodates a consistent representation of energy markets in physical units as well as 
detailed data on regional production, consumption, and bilateral trade flows. Besides the GTAP 
dataset, EPPA uses additional data for greenhouse gases and air pollutant emissions based on 
United States Environmental Protection Agency inventory data.  
 
The model is calibrated based upon data organized into social accounting matrices (SAM) that 
include quantities demanded and trade flows in a base year denominated in both physical and 
value terms. A SAM quantifies the inputs and outputs of each sector, which allow for the 
calculation of input shares, or the fraction of total sector expenditures represented by each input. 
Much of the sector detail in the EPPA model is focused on providing a more accurate 
representation of energy production and use as it may change over time or under policies that 
would limit greenhouse gas emissions. The base year of the EPPA model is 1997. From 2000 the 
model solves recursively at five-year intervals. Sectors are modeled using nested constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions (with Cobb-Douglass or Leontief forms). 
The model is solved in the Mathematical Programming System for General Equilibrium 
                                                 
1
 The EPPA model can also be solved as a forward looking model (Gurgel et al., 2007). Solved in that manner the 
behavior is very similar in terms of abatement and CO2-e prices compared to a recursive solution with the same 
model features.  However, the solution requires elimination of some of the technological alternatives. 
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(MPSGE) language as a mixed complementarity problem (Mathiesen, 1985; Rutherford, 1995). 
The resulting equilibrium in each period must satisfy three inequalities: the zero profit, market 
clearance, and income balance conditions (for more information, see Paltsev et al., 2005). 
 
The level of aggregation of the model is presented in Table 1. The model includes representation 
of abatement of CO
2 
and non-CO
2
 greenhouse gas emissions (CH
4
, N
2
O, HFCs, PFCs and SF
6
) 
and the calculations consider both the emissions mitigation that occurs as a byproduct of actions 
directed at CO
2
 and reductions resulting from gas-specific control measures. Targeted control 
measures include reductions in the emissions of: CO
2
 from the combustion of fossil fuels; the 
industrial gases that replace CFCs controlled by the Montreal Protocol and produced at 
aluminum smelters; CH
4
 from fossil energy production and use, agriculture, and waste, and N
2
O 
from fossil fuel combustion, chemical production and improved fertilizer use. More detail on 
how abatement costs are represented for these substances is provided in Hyman et al. (2003).  
 
Non-energy activities are aggregated into six sectors, as shown in the table. The energy sector, 
which emits several of the non-CO
2
 gases as well as CO
2
, is modeled in more detail. The 
synthetic coal gas industry produces a perfect substitute for natural gas. The oil shale industry 
produces a perfect substitute for refined oil. All electricity generation technologies produce 
perfectly substitutable electricity except for Solar and Wind technology, which is modeled as 
producing an imperfect substitute, to reflect intermittent output.  
 
The regional and sectoral disaggregation is also shown in Table 1. There are 16 geographical 
regions represented explicitly in the model including major countries (the US, Japan, Canada, 
China, India, and Indonesia) and 10 regions that are an aggregations of countries.  Each region 
includes detail on economic sectors (agriculture, services, industrial and household 
transportation, energy intensive industry) and a more elaborated representation of energy sector 
technologies. 
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Table 1. EPPA Model Details. 
Country or Region
†
  Sectors Factors 
Developed Final Demand Sectors Capital  
   United States (USA) Agriculture  Labor  
   Canada (CAN) Services  Crude Oil Resources 
   Japan (JPN) Energy-Intensive Products  Natural Gas Resources 
   European Union+ (EUR) Other Industries Products  Coal Resources 
   Australia & New Zealand (ANZ) Transportation  Shale Oil Resources 
   Former Soviet Union (FSU) Household Transportation  Nuclear Resources 
   Eastern Europe (EET) Other Household Demand Hydro Resources 
Developing Energy Supply & Conversion Wind/Solar Resources 
   India (IND)  Electric Generation Land 
   China (CHN)     Conventional Fossil   
   Indonesia (IDZ)      Hydro   
   Higher Income East Asia
 
(ASI)      Nuclear   
   Mexico (MEX)      Wind, Solar   
   Central & South America (LAM)      Biomass   
   Middle East (MES)      Advanced Gas (NGCC)   
   Africa (AFR)      Advanced Gas with CCS   
   Rest of World (ROW)       Advanced Coal with CCS   
   Fuels  
      Coal  
       Crude Oil, Shale Oil, Refined Oil   
      Natural Gas, Gas from Coal  
      Liquids from Biomass  
       Synthetic Gas    
† 
Specific detail on regional groupings is provided in Paltsev et al. (2005). 
 
When emissions constraints on certain countries, gases, or sectors are imposed in a CGE model 
such as EPPA, the model calculates a shadow value of the constraint which can be interpreted as 
a price that would be obtained under an allowance market that developed under a cap and trade 
system. Those prices are the marginal costs used in the construction of marginal abatement cost 
(MAC) curves. They are plotted against a corresponding amount of abatement, which is the 
difference in emissions levels between a no policy reference case and a policy-constrained case.  
 
The solution algorithm of the EPPA model finds least-cost reductions for each gas in each sector 
and if emissions trading is allowed it equilibrates the prices among sectors and gases (using 
GWP weights). This set of conditions, often referred to as ―what‖ and ―where‖ flexibility, will 
tend to lead to least-cost abatement.  Without these conditions abatement costs will vary among 
sources and that will affect the estimated welfare cost—abatement will be least-cost within a 
sector or region or for a specific gas, but will not be equilibrated among them.   
 
The results depend on a number of aspects of model structure and particular input assumptions 
that greatly simplify the representation of economic structure and decision-making.  For 
example, the difficulty of achieving any emissions path is influenced by assumptions about 
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population and productivity growth that underlie the no-policy reference case. The simulations 
also embody a particular representation of the structure of the economy, including the relative 
ease of substitution among the inputs to production and the behavior of consumers in the face of 
changing prices of fuels, electricity and other goods and services.  Further critical assumptions 
must be made about the cost and performance of new technologies and what might limit their 
market penetration. Alternatives to conventional technologies in the electric sector and in 
transportation are particularly significant.  Finally, the EPPA model draws heavily on 
neoclassical economic theory.  While this underpinning is a strength in some regards, the model 
fails to capture economic rigidities that could lead to unemployment or misallocation of 
resources nor does it capture regulatory and policy details that can be important in regulated 
sectors such as power generation.  
 
I use EPPA to compare shadow prices (i.e., carbon prices) with and without REDD under 
emission constraints and different trading scenarios. 
4.2 Emission Targets 
The compliance period for the Kyoto Protocol commitments is 2008 through 2012. Since REDD 
market entry is not foreseeable during the Kyoto Protocol compliance period, I assume that 
REDD credits will be available as part of an emission trading scheme under a post-Kyoto 
agreement. To model REDD, this requires assuming hypothetical emission commitments for all 
participating regions as targets are not finalized. Based on the 2009 G8 Summit talks and 
CLEAR (Carbon Limits + Early Action   = Rewards) Target (Wagner et al., 2009), I assume the 
following targets. 
US
OECD 
Europe Russia
Canada, Japan, Rest 
of OECD Pacific
Rest of E. 
Europe/Eurasia Developing Countries
2020 -17% -20% -10% 10% -10% BAU until 2018
2050 -80% -80% -80% -80% -50% -30%  
 * % difference from 1990 levels 
 
Conceptually, CLEAR targets, also known as Clean Investment Budgets, represent the idea that 
emerging economies adopt targets that are initially above current levels but within the 2 degree 
Celsius global goal
2
; this provides immediate availability of allowances for industrialized nations 
while providing funding for emerging economies to transition to a low-carbon economy (Wagner 
et al., 2009). In the 2009 G8 Summit in L‘Aquila Italy, G8 countries have committed to reduce 
their GHG emissions by 80% by 2050 from 1990 levels, and other major emitting countries have 
agreed to reduce their emissions by 50% by 2050 (G8 Summit Papers, 2009). For developing 
countries, I modeled a stringent scenario where they reach a 30 percent reduction below their 
respective 1990 levels by 2050, with reductions starting in 2019. These developing countries 
include the REDD supplying regions. All emission targets are assumed to decline linearly. 
 
4.3 Reference ‘No REDD’ Case 
Emissions trading allow participating nations to reduce emissions cost-effectively. In addition, 
carbon offsets come in many forms. Therefore, the effects of REDD trading needs to be isolated 
                                                 
2
 Agreement to keep mean global temperature within 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial level 
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from non-REDD offsets (i.e., trading emissions reductions in industrial sectors) to understand the 
sole effect of REDD credits. I designate the trading scenario without REDD as the reference ‗No 
REDD‘ case, which is modeled as the emissions targets described above with full global 
emissions trading allowed. The REDD allowances are then added to the resulting emissions from 
the ‗No REDD‘ case, and these new emissions are imposed as the new emission caps. This 
allows REDD offsets to be isolated from other allowances and other non-REDD offsets. 
Therefore, REDD trading occurs ex post the reference case, where all other offset and 
allowances are traded prior to REDD entering the market. These revised emission targets are 
added as a constraint in EPPA and are used for all scenarios for comparison purposes.  
 
4.4 REDD Supply 
I use marginal cost estimates to capture the potential supply of REDD. The marginal cost curves 
relate the opportunity costs of REDD to the amount of emissions reduced from REDD-activities; 
these costs include the forgone profits from reduced deforestation in sectors such as agricultural, 
or forestry products, as well as administrative costs to cover forest management. 
 
I use an amended MAC curve based on estimates from the Global Timber Model (GTM). The 
Global Timber Model
3
 is a partial equilibrium intertemporal optimization economic model that 
maximizes welfare across 250 world timber supply regions through the management of forest 
stand ages, compositions, and acreage given production and land rental costs. The model 
simulates trade responses to policy by predicting supply responses to current and future prices 
(EPA Analysis of H.R. 2454, 2010). The model assumes that all international mitigation 
practices are eligible from 2010 to 2050, and that mitigation activity is disaggregated into 
afforestation, forest management, and avoided deforestation. The model estimates the aggregated 
international forestry marginal abatement costs (EPA Analysis of H.R. 2454, 2010). Using 
estimated shares of total forest carbon mitigation attributed to reduced deforestation from Murray 
et al. (2009), the MAC is adjusted to reflect mitigation from reduced deforestation activities 
(Figure 4).  
 
Typically we would just equate the REDD supply and regional MAC curves to determine the 
cost-effective allocation of REDD. However, REDD is not implemented endogenously in EPPA 
and cannot represent REDD MAC curves explicitly. I allocate a fixed supply of REDD 
allowances over time, based on the MAC curve in Figure 4. For the base case, I use the 
maximum available REDD in each year, which I define as the level at which costs turn vertical - 
as noted by the circles in Figure 4.  
 
                                                 
3
 Developed by Brent Sohngen from the Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and Developmental Economics 
(Ohio State University) with collaboration from Robert Mendlesohn, Roger Sedjo, and Kenneth Lyon 
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Figure 4.  Global Avoided Deforestation Costs 
 
These estimates are based on a global assessment. Since EPPA is a multi-region CGE model, 
these estimates need to be disaggregated regionally. I use estimates from three forestry and land-
use models from Kindermann et al. (2008): 
 
(1) Dynamic Integrated Model of Forestry and Alternative Land Use (DIMA): assesses land-
use options in agriculture and forestry across the globe. The model predicts deforestation 
in forests where land values are greater in agriculture than in forestry, and vice versa, 
afforestation of agricultural and grazing lands where forestry values exceed agricultural 
ones.  
(2) Generalized Comprehensive Mitigation Assessment Process Model (GCOMAP): a 
dynamic partial equilibrium model that analyzes afforestation in short- and long-run 
species and reductions in deforestation in 10 world regions. 
(3) Global Timber Model (GTM): dynamic optimization model that optimizes the land area, 
age class distribution, and management of forestlands in 250 timber types globally.  
(Kindermann et al., 2008) 
 
Each model has model-specific assumptions about the future of agricultural land rents, demand 
for forestry products, technological change, and other economic drivers; the models provide 
future deforestation projections and the resulting emissions of carbon into the atmosphere 
(Kindermann et al., 2008). The three models estimate the costs for avoiding tropical 
deforestation globally and for the three major tropical deforestation regions: Central and South 
24 
 
America, Africa, and Southeast Asia (Figure 5). I use these MAC curves to estimate the 
reduction contribution by region. As above, I assume the maximum available credits are where 
costs go vertical; since I only use these MAC curves to estimate the regional contributions, I 
aggregate the estimates between models and years and assume that the percent contribution by 
region remains constant. I use the calculated regional contribution estimates to regionally 
disaggregate the global REDD credits shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 5. Marginal Costs of emission reductions from avoided deforestation activities in 2020 in three regions from three 
models (Kindermann et al., 2008) 
Because EPPA does not model REDD endogenously, I model these regional REDD credits as 
additional allowances allocations to the supplying region. For example, suppose Central & South 
America‘s (LAM) reference emission targets are 1000mmt C. If LAM has 30mmt C available 
REDD credits, then I raise LAM‘s carbon quota to 1030mmt C; therefore, LAM has 30mmt C 
additional allowances that it can trade with its trading partners. In addition, for Southeast Asia, I 
assumed that all REDD activities occurs in Indonesia for accounting simplicity, since regions in 
Southeast Asia are not aggregated. 
4.5 Demand Restrictions 
In the proposed American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454, Waxman-Markey 
Bill), there is a carbon offset restriction of 2 billion metric tons CO2 (bmt CO2), where 1 bmt 
CO2 offsets are limited to domestic sources and the remainder limits the international offsets 
available. If there are insufficient domestic offsets available, up to 1.5 bmt CO2 can be obtained 
internationally. After 2017, international offsets are discounted; for every 1.25 international 
offset acquired, only one offset is credited. For this analysis, I assume that the US can only 
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acquire 1bmt CO2 of REDD offsets for all years for my analysis. I only focus on demand 
restrictions from the US due to computational limitations. 
 
Since REDD is modeled as additional emission allowance and is available for all trading 
partners, the allocation of REDD is the only exogenous constraint on the quantity of REDD 
acquired by the US. Therefore, to model the US 1bmt CO2 international offset restriction, I 
implemented and iterative-algorithm (in Matlab) to determine the correct REDD allocation such 
that US acquires 1bmt CO2 REDD offsets. The methodology is as follows: 
 
1. Start with an initial guess for the starting REDD allocation 
2. Call EPPA to run the scenario of interest with the starting REDD allocation. 
3. Compare US emissions levels from EPPA to US emissions with 1bmt CO2 REDD offsets 
(US reference case emissions + 1bmt CO2) 
4. If they diverge, recalculate a new REDD allocation to input into EPPA 
5. Repeat until convergence in step 4  
Convergence is defined to be where emissions are within 3E-5 of each other.  
 
A limitation of using this approach to model demand constraints is that additional demand 
constraints from other regions over-constrains the problem thus making solution is 
indeterminate. Therefore, I only focus on US demand restrictions for this study. Since this 
method is computationally intensive, I only investigated the two extreme trading scenarios: US-
only and All Regions. 
4.6 Cost Uncertainties 
To observe cost-containment behavior, cost uncertainties need to be simulated. I apply 
assumptions from Webster et al. (2008b), which identified 110 parameters in the EPPA model 
that affect emissions growth and abatement costs. These include parameters representing labor 
productivity growth rates, energy efficiency trends, elasticities of substitution, cost of advanced 
technologies, fossil fuel resource availability, and urban pollutant trends (Webster et al., 2008b). 
Probability distributions for these parameters were developed based on historical data and expert 
judgment. 
 
Here, I perform Monte Carlo simulation using Latin Hypercube sampling with 400 samples 
drawn from each of the parameter distributions. These samples are input into the EPPA model to 
generate cost uncertainties. I compare the carbon prices with and without REDD under different 
trading scenarios and US offset restrictions to determine if REDD exhibits cost containing 
behavior and if trading scenarios and offset demand restriction limit cost-containing behavior. 
4.7 REDD Supply Uncertainties 
There are underlying uncertainties in the REDD supply estimates, primarily from uncertainties in 
opportunity costs estimates and deployment estimates. Since opportunity costs consist of forgone 
profits from deforestation-related activities, they are influenced by agricultural prices and other 
market prices, which, like all markets, are subjected to uncertainties. In addition, deployment of 
these credits depends on a country‘s readiness level to enter the market, which can be due to 
access to monitoring and operating forest management system. While there are efforts from the 
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Bali Action Plan to encourage REDD-readiness activities, there is no certainty as to how much 
REDD will actually be available in the emissions trading scheme.  
 
Using high to low opportunity cost scenarios based on fast to slow deployment scenarios, I 
construct probability distributions representing supply uncertainties. The deployment scenarios 
are as follows: 
 
Central & S. America Africa SE Asia
Slow
10% credits in 2013
rest phased over 2013-2022
phased in over 15 yrs 
(2031-2045)
phased in over 15 yrs 
(2021-2035)
Medium
30% credits in 2013
rest phased over 2013-2022
phased in over 15 yrs 
(2026-2040)
phased in over 15 yrs 
(2016-2030)
Fast
50% credits in 2013
rest phased over 2013-2017
phased in over 10 yrs 
(2026-2035)
phased in over 10 yrs 
(2016-2025)
REGIONS
D
E
P
L
O
Y
M
E
N
T
 
 
The three opportunity cost scenarios as based on the three forestry and land use models from 
Section 4.4. High opportunity costs use estimates from DIMA; medium opportunity costs are 
scaled to the GCOMAP model, and low opportunity costs are scaled to GTM model estimates, 
see Figure 5. Probability distributions are fit around these scenarios, with the following 
probability assumptions: 
 
Deployment: 
Fast: 25% probability 
Medium: 50% probability 
Slow: 25% probability 
 
Opportunity Cost: 
High: 25% probability 
Medium: 50% probability 
Low: 25% probability 
 
I use these scenarios to construct two alternative probability distributions for supply uncertainty: 
(1) combined deployment and opportunity cost uncertainties; and (2) opportunity cost 
uncertainties with fast deployment. Using Monte Carlo simulation, 400 samples are drawn from 
each supply distribution and modeled into EPPA to simulate supply uncertainties. These are 
incorporated into EPPA and modeled with REDD offsets to determine the effect of supply 
uncertainties on the cost-containment effectiveness of REDD.  
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5. Results 
I analyzed REDD offsets deterministically and stochastically. The deterministic results illustrate 
the effect of REDD offsets on expected costs. The stochastic analysis assesses the effects of 
REDD on carbon price uncertainty, which is the central to understand whether REDD reduces 
upside risk through cost-containment. As mentioned in Chapter 4, I analyze two demand and 
supply scenarios to assess the effect of increased scarcity of REDD on carbon price. The demand 
scenarios examine the effect of (1) competition over demand for REDD as seen by increasing the 
number of regions that can purchase REDD, and (2) limitations on the number of REDD credits 
a region can purchase. Supply scenarios are based on opportunity cost uncertainties of REDD 
based on a range of deployment rates. 
 
In Section 5.1, I present the results of the deterministic scenario analysis. Section 5.2 presents 
Monte Carlo results of REDD without supply uncertainties, both Section 5.1 and 5.2 assume no 
restriction on offset purchases. Section 5.3 presents the results of the US restriction on offsets 
purchases using deterministic and Monte Carlo analysis. Section 5.4 presents Monte Carlo 
results with supply uncertainties. Lastly, Section 5.5 presents the results of the special scenario 
where China is allowed to purchase REDD offsets with Annex I regions; this scenario is 
analyzed both deterministically and stochastically. 
5.1 Deterministic Results 
In this section, I show results for the three main trading scenarios, defined in terms of the regions 
that can purchase REDD offsets: (1) US-only; (2) Annex I; (3) All Regions. I discuss results for 
the scenario that allows Annex I and China to purchase REDD in Section 5.5 below as it exhibits 
unique dynamics. Deterministic analysis of REDD credits show that REDD credits lower 
expected compliance costs for all three scenarios, as shown in Figure 6; Table 2 summarizes the 
carbon prices and relative cost savings from REDD by year and trading scenario.  
 
Increasing competition via increasing the number of REDD buyers plays a significant role in 
reducing the expected savings from including REDD. The largest carbon price reduction occurs 
when US is the only region that purchases REDD as they have access to the entire global supply 
of REDD. The US-only scenario reduces expected carbon prices by 75% in 2040 and 54% in 
2050. As more regions are allowed to purchase REDD, the effect of REDD on carbon price is 
diminished as each region purchases fewer allowances due to increased competition in demand. 
In the US-only and Annex I scenarios, the surplus of REDD allowances generates carbon leakage, 
as indicated by US emissions exceeding emissions under the ‗No Policy‘ (BAU) scenario (Figure 
6). However, even under the most competitive scenario, All Regions, there is still a 41% 
reduction in expected costs, which is substantial. 
 
In later years, REDD has a diminished effect in reducing costs as emission targets become more 
stringent; the relative quantity of REDD allowances, with respect to required emissions 
abatement, decreases over time. Also, the effect of competition over demand also decreases over 
time (Figure 6). This is evident by the carbon price gap between the Annex I and All Regions 
scenarios decreasing significantly in later years, most notably in 2050. In addition, the difference 
in US emissions between the Annex I and All Regions scenarios is reduced in the years 2040 
through 2050. In these years, several regions, most notably China and the Middle East regions, 
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purchase fewer REDD offsets under the All Regions scenario thus allowing the US and other 
Annex I nations to purchase more REDD thereby reducing the difference in emissions in Annex 
I regions for the Annex I and All Regions scenarios, as observed in US emissions in Figure 6. 
These trading dynamics generate more cost savings for the All Regions scenario for 2040 through 
2050 thus reducing the carbon price difference between Annex I and All Regions. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Carbon Prices for different trading scenarios and percent reduction from 'No REDD' Reference Case 
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Figure 6. US Emissions and Carbon Prices under three REDD Trading Scenarios 
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5.2 Stochastic Simulation Results 
In this section, I present Monte Carlo simulation results using the 400 cost and emissions 
uncertainty samples on the same three major trading scenarios from Section 5.1 above. Monte 
Carlo results of REDD show that REDD credits reduce carbon prices at the median, 95
th
 and 99
th
 
percentile of the carbon price distribution (Tables 3, 4, and 5, Figure 7).  
 
In general, the costs at the median of the carbon price distribution (Table 3) are similar to the 
expected costs from deterministic results (Table 2). There are some minor differences in later 
years, where expected costs are slightly higher than median costs; these differences show that the 
carbon price distribution is slightly skewed. The relative reductions in costs, as a percentage of 
No REDD costs, are similar for costs at the 95th/99
th
 percentile, expected and median, with some 
differences in later years. The carbon prices at the upper tail of the distribution (at the 95
th
 and 
99
th
 percentile) show slightly higher relative reductions than median and expected carbon prices. 
Although relative reductions are comparatively consistent between expected costs, median costs 
and costs at the upper tail end of the distribution, the actual reductions in carbon price are greater 
in the tails since the costs are highest at the tails (Table 4 and 5).  
 
As in the deterministic results, the effect of competition over demand plays a significant role on 
carbon prices, as seen in 2030 in Figure 8. Similarly, these effects diminish in later years as 
targets get more stringent in later years; this restricts demand more than from increased 
competition. In 2040 and 2050, US purchases larger amounts of REDD under the US-only and 
All Regions scenario compared to 2030; however these larger amounts do not translate into 
substantial cost savings as seen in earlier years thus confirming the effect of more stringent 
targets (Figure 8). 
 
As in deterministic analysis, REDD and increasing competition over demand for REDD have a 
diminished effect over costs in the later years; Annex I and All Regions trading scenarios exhibit 
similar behaviors as in deterministic scenarios, where differences between these two cases 
decrease and almost disappear by 2050. This effect is stronger at the tails of the distribution, 
where the differences in cost between the Annex I and All Regions scenarios are smaller at the 
tails than at the median during these later years (Table 4 and 5). Moreover, in 2050, the 
differences between US-only with Annex I and All Regions scenarios are noticeable reduced, 
especially at the tails of the distribution (Figure 7 and 8).  
 
Therefore, deterministic and Monte Carlo results show that REDD credits reduce expected costs 
and reduce median and tail end costs thus containing costs under cost uncertainty. Monte Carlo 
results show that relative cost savings at median and upper tail end of the carbon price 
distribution, are relatively consistent by percentage of No REDD costs; therefore, actual cost 
savings at the upper tail of the carbon price distribution are substantially higher than at the 
median or expected values. Hence, REDD credits yield larger cost savings during high costs than 
at lower costs. Competition over demand plays a significant role in the early years, as increasing 
buyers reduces cost savings from REDD. However, since emission targets are more stringent in 
later years, the competition effect over demand is significantly diminished as targets are more 
limiting on demand over REDD. 
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Table 3. Median Carbon Prices for different trading scenarios and percent reduction from 'No REDD' Reference Case 
 
 
Table 4. Carbon Prices at the 95th percentile for different trading scenarios and percent reduction from 'No REDD' 
Reference Case 
 
Table 5. Carbon Prices at the 99th percentile for different trading scenarios and percent reduction from 'No REDD' 
Reference Case 
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Figure 7. Carbon Price Distribution for 2030, 2040, 2050 
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Figure 8. Carbon Price vs. Median REDD Acquired by US in 2030, 2040, and 2050 
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5.3 Demand Restrictions 
In this section, I discuss deterministic and Monte Carlo results from adding an additional 
restriction to the US where international offsets purchased in any year cannot exceed 1bmt CO2. 
In this section, I restrict my analysis to two trading scenarios: (1) US-only and (2) All Regions. In 
all results, the US is the only region with imposed restrictions on purchasing offsets. 
5.3.1 Deterministic Results 
The results of adding this restriction under emissions and cost certainty show that demand 
restrictions reduce the effectiveness of REDD in reducing compliance costs, as shown in Figure 
9.  The reductions in cost savings from the demand restriction increase over time as shown in 
Table 6 and Figure 9. The carbon price under both restricted scenarios rises above that of the 
unrestricted All Regions scenario. Thus, demand restrictions reduce the costs savings from 
REDD more than does increased competition. Note that the differences in carbon prices between 
the two restricted trading scenarios are small compared to the unrestricted case for the same two 
trading scenarios; therefore, demand restrictions weaken competition effects as these demand 
restrictions are more limiting on the demand over REDD credits. In general, the All Regions 
scenario reduces costs a little more than the US-only scenario since the All Regions scenario 
allows other regions to purchase offsets without affecting US demand for REDD thus capturing 
cheaper abatement opportunities that did not exist in US-only scenario, with exception of a few 
years, 2020, 2030, and 2035. During these years, the global supply of REDD offsets needed for 
the US to purchase 1bmt CO2 is greater than the assumed maximum supply for that given year; 
therefore, US emissions are lower and carbon prices are higher in the All Regions than in the US-
only scenario during those years. 
 
 
 Table 6. Percent Carbon Price Reduction under Demand Restrictions (R denotes US demand restriction) 
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Figure 9. US Emissions and Carbon Price under US Demand Restrictions (Deterministic) 
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5.32 Stochastic Simulation Results 
As in the deterministic results, US demand restrictions significantly reduce the cost savings from 
REDD for all years. Carbon price distributions for the restricted US-only scenario start 
overlapping the distribution from the unrestricted All Regions scenario in early years and shifts 
further right (towards increasing carbon price) (Figure 10). As in deterministic results, costs 
under both restricted US-only and restricted All Regions scenario are higher than costs under the 
unrestricted All Regions scenario at the median and at the tails of the carbon price distribution 
(Tables 7, 8, and 9).  
 
In general, the US offset restriction slightly skews the carbon price distribution slightly to the 
right, except for 2040. This effect is more pronounced for the restricted US-only scenario. The 
restricted All Regions scenario shows no skew for 2035 and 2040. Similar to deterministic 
results, the restricted All Regions scenario generally has lower costs than the restricted US-only 
scenario.  
 
Note that even though we establish a ‗No REDD‘ reference, the trade of additional non-REDD 
offsets is unavoidable based on the current exogenous implementation of offsets in EPA. 
Therefore, there are residual non-REDD (i.e., industrial emission reduction) allowances traded, 
but these remain small compared to REDD. However, this effect is pronounced for the restricted 
scenarios at the 99
th
 percentile for 2045 and 2050, where costs exceed the No REDD case. For 
the restricted US-only scenario, during these last years, extreme high costs at the tail end cause 
REDD supplying regions, especially Central and South America and Africa, to trade non-REDD 
offsets, in addition to REDD offsets; as a result, emissions to drop below No REDD reference 
emissions for these REDD supplying regions thus raising costs for these later years. Moreover, 
during these years, the costs from restricted All Regions scenario exceed the costs from the 
restricted US-only scenario at the upper tail end of the distribution thereby further exceeding No 
REDD costs. These higher costs at the tail end of the distribution for the restricted All Regions 
scenario is a result of emission trading dynamics; some regions, particularly Europe, the Former 
Soviet Union, Japan and China, take on significant emission reductions compared to the 
restricted US-only scenario. Since most of these regions tend to have high marginal abatement 
costs, these emission reductions drive carbon prices higher for the restricted All Regions 
scenario. 
 
Therefore, REDD demand restrictions may provide some relief for price shocks for early years; 
however, cost savings are substantially reduced even exceeding the most competitive trading 
scenario, All Regions, under the case of no purchasing restrictions. In later years, 2045-2050, 
these restrictions can effectively render REDD ineffective at reducing carbon price uncertainty.  
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Table 7.  Median Carbon Prices for different trading scenarios and percent reduction from 'No REDD' Reference Case 
(Demand Restriction) 
 
Table 8. Carbon Prices at 95th percentile for different trading scenarios and percent reduction from 'No REDD' 
Reference Case (Demand Restriction) 
 
 
Table 9. Carbon Prices at 99th percentile for different trading scenarios and percent reduction from 'No REDD' 
Reference Case (Demand Restriction) 
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Figure 10. Carbon Price Distribution under US Demand Restrictions for 2030, 2040, 2050 
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5.4 Supply Uncertainty 
In this section, I discuss Monte Carlo results from the two supply uncertainty scenarios: (1) 
combined and (2) fast deployment. The differences between these two supply scenarios are small 
but there are some slight differences in the early years, which diminish in later years. In the early 
years, the ‗fast‘ scenario reduces carbon prices more than the ‗combined‘ scenario since there is 
a greater probability of a larger REDD supply in the early years. After 2040, the differences 
between the combined and fast REDD supply scenarios are reduced; the more stringent targets 
are more restrictive than supply uncertainties. Since results for the two supply scenarios are 
similar, I focus on the combined opportunity cost and deployment uncertainty supply scenario 
results. 
 
In general, the presence of opportunity cost and deployment uncertainties reduce the cost savings 
of REDD. For instance, in 2050, the reduction in carbon price for the US-only scenario at the 
median is 33%, compared to 58% without supply uncertainties (Table 10 and 3).  
 
These supply uncertainties significantly impact the US-only scenario; in 2030, there is more 
variation in carbon prices compared to the base case with no supply uncertainties (Figure 7 and 
11). This increase in carbon price variation for the US-only scenario in 2030 results in reduced 
cost savings at the tail of the distribution compared to the median (Table 10, 11, and 12). 
Contrary to the no supply uncertainty results, relative cost savings, as a percentage of No REDD 
costs, between the median and 95
th
 and 99
th
 percentile are not consistent; relative cost savings 
decreases at the upper tails of the distribution, where the US-only scenario is impacted the most 
due to the increase in carbon price variation. The addition of supply uncertainties further 
diminish the effects of competition over demand in later years, where stringent targets further 
increase REDD scarcity (Figure 11 and 12).  
 
 
Table 10. Median Carbon Prices for different trading scenarios and percent reduction from 'No REDD' Reference Case 
(Combined Supply Uncertainty Scenario) 
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Table 11. Carbon Prices at 95th percentile for different trading scenarios and percent reduction from 'No REDD' 
Reference Case (Combined Supply Uncertainty Scenario) 
 
Table 12. Carbon Prices at 99th percentile for different trading scenarios and percent reduction from 'No REDD' 
Reference Case (Combined Supply Uncertainty Scenario) 
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Figure 11. Carbon Price Distribution for Combined Supply Scenarios (2030, 2040, 2050) 
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Figure 12. Carbon Price vs. Median REDD Acquired by US for Combined Supply Scenarios (2030, 2040, 2050) 
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5.5 The Addition of China 
In this section, I present the results for the case where China can also purchase REDD 
allowances with Annex I regions. China compared to Annex I countries tends to have lower 
abatement costs compared to Annex I countries. Thus, the addition of only China presents an 
interesting scenario, where it can either compete for REDD allowance purchases or compete with 
REDD allowance sales.  
5.51 Deterministic Results 
As in the base case in Section 5.1, the deterministic results shows that, for the early years, 
increased competition over demand from allowing China to purchase REDD with Annex I 
regions reduces expected cost savings from REDD credits (Figure 13, Table 13). However, in the 
later years, the expected cost differences between Annex I and Annex I & China disappear, and in 
2050, expected costs in the Annex I & China scenario is less than in the Annex I scenario (Figure 
13). Moreover, during these later years, the difference in US emissions between Annex I and 
Annex I & China also disappear; therefore, US acquires similar amounts of REDD credits under 
both scenarios. In fact, after 2030, China starts to purchase fewer REDD credits, which allows 
Annex I countries to acquire more REDD (Figure 14). By 2050, China acquires 90% less REDD 
in 2050 compared to 2030, and US purchases more REDD in the Annex I & China scenario than 
Annex 1 scenario (Figure 14), which explains why costs are lower with the addition of China. 
 
 
Table 13. Carbon Prices and percent reduction from 'No REDD' Reference Case (with the addition of China) 
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Figure 13. US Emissions and Carbon Price, China Effect (Deterministic) 
  
 
 
45 
 
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2030 2040 2050
Delta Emissions with the Addition of China
US
Annex 1
China
 
Figure 14. Emissions Difference between the Addition of China from Annex I alone 
 
5.5.2 Stochastic Simulation Results 
As in the deterministic analysis, Monte Carlo results of REDD for the scenario where China is 
allowed to purchase REDD with Annex I show a reduction in cost savings in the early years, and 
the differences between Annex I and Annex I & China scenarios diminish in later years (Tables 
14, 15, 16, and Figure 15). Starting in 2045, median carbon prices for the Annex I & China 
scenario are lower than in the Annex I scenario; for the 95
th
 and 99
th
 percentile, this trend in 
carbon prices starts in 2040 (Table 15 and 16).  
 
Based on deterministic results, Annex I nations start purchasing more REDD after 2040 since 
China gradually purchases less REDD offsets. In Monte Carlo results, these trading dynamics are 
more pronounced at the tail end of the carbon price distribution. Starting in 2040, the right tail of 
the carbon price distribution in the Annex I & China scenario is pulled in more than in the Annex 
I scenario (Figure 15), and carbon prices at the tails are lower for the Annex I & China scenario 
(Figure 16). Within Annex I and China regions, China is one of the countries with the lowest 
marginal abatement costs. Stringent emission targets in later years cause China purchase fewer 
REDD allowances since it is cost-effective for China to abate more than other regions thereby 
allowing the Annex I countries to purchase more REDD credits. In 2040, these trading dynamics 
are more pronounced at the tails since abatement is more costly at the tails; therefore, the cost 
savings is initially observed at the tails of the distribution. These trading dynamics are also 
visible at the median as the differences in the amount of REDD credits purchased by the US in 
the Annex I & China scenario and the Annex I scenario are reduced (Figure 16). As in the 
deterministic results, in 2050, China significantly reduces REDD purchases thereby allowing 
Annex I countries to purchase more REDD; this allows the US to purchase more REDD credits 
and costs remain lower than the Annex I scenario. 
 
Therefore, the effect of allowing China to purchase REDD offsets with Annex I regions 
introduces interesting dynamics. In the early years, the addition of China reduces cost savings 
from REDD due competition over demand. Starting in 2040, due stringent targets, China 
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purchases fewer REDD offsets thus allowing Annex I nations to purchase more REDD; this 
results in cost savings at the tails of the distribution. Carbon prices continue to reduce in later 
years, such that expected costs in the Annex I & China scenario are lower than expected costs in 
the Annex I scenario. 
 
Table 14. Median Carbon Prices and percent reduction from 'No REDD' Reference Case (with the addition of China) 
 
 
Table 15. Carbon Prices at 95th percentile and percent reduction from 'No REDD' Reference Case (with the addition of 
China) 
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Table 16. Carbon Prices at 99th percentile and percent reduction from 'No REDD' Reference Case (with the addition of 
China) 
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Figure 15. Carbon Price Distribution - China (2030, 2040, 2050) 
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Figure 16. Carbon Price vs. Median REDD Acquired by US (China) in 2030, 2040, and 2050 
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6. Policy Implications 
Based on the analysis presented above, carbon offsets such as REDD not only will lower 
expected costs, but also, have the potential to reduce upside carbon price uncertainties. 
Therefore, carbon offsets can provide an alternative cost-containment flexibility mechanism in 
climate change legislation. Carbon offsets are an attractive cost-containment instrument as it 
does not involve using domestic allowances, and it incentivizes further global participation to 
reduce global GHG emissions. In addition, growing demand for carbon offsets can increase 
development aid for carbon offset producing nations. The demand for carbon offsets as a cost-
containment instrument would further incentivize the use of offsets in climate legislation, and 
rising demand of offsets from developed nations would encourage efforts to further expand the 
availability of more offsets, like REDD. In addition, the availability of REDD offsets in an 
emissions trading scheme would allow developed nations to utilize otherwise unavailable 
deforestation and forest degradation mitigation options thus providing the vital financial support 
to considerably curb deforestation. In addition, the increased interest in REDD could spur the 
development and standardization of monitoring and verification methods for REDD activities. 
Therefore, carbon offsets can offer benefits for both developed and developing nations, thereby 
promoting global participation.  
 
Cost-containment instruments address a variety of cost uncertainties, such as start-up, short-term, 
and long term uncertainties (Webster et al., 2008a). The ability of carbon offsets to address these 
cost uncertainties depends on the supply of carbon offsets. Carbon offsets can address start-up 
cost uncertainties if there is a sufficient supply of offsets available during the inception of an 
emissions trading scheme. Short-term cost uncertainties can be addressed if carbon offsets are 
available for specific short periods of time, and long-term uncertainties can be addressed if 
carbon offset supply can be sustained for a long period of time.  
 
Scarcity of offsets can reduce the cost-containment effectiveness, where scarcity can be affected 
by changes in the demand for and the supply of offsets. Current assessments of the supply of 
REDD offsets are based on assumptions of opportunity costs and deployment rates; therefore, 
uncertainties in opportunity costs and deployment rates can make assessing supply difficult. As 
shown in the results in Chapter 5,  supply uncertainties due to uncertainties in opportunity costs 
and deployment rates can significantly affect the effectiveness of REDD as a cost-containment 
instrument. These uncertainties have the greatest impact in the early years thus affecting start-up 
cost containment effectiveness. In addition, if there is significant inter-year supply variability, 
this can limit short-term cost containment if carbon offset supply is too small to compensate for 
high carbon prices.  
 
Moreover, increased offset scarcities in later years may be inevitable. As discussed in Section 
4.2, emission targets tend get more stringent in later years. Emission target trajectories are 
typically constructed to be less stringent in earlier years to facilitate infrastructure changes, such 
as technology investment, to meet future emission targets. These increasingly stringent emission 
targets make offsets scarcer since stringent targets require purchasing larger amounts of offsets 
to compensate for the larger emission reductions thereby increasing the demand for offsets. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of offsets as a long-term cost-containment instrument will depend on 
whether the supply of offsets can increase in later years to meet the increased demand. However, 
51 
 
opportunity costs for carbon offsets in later years are likely to increase as all low cost options are 
likely to be exhausted early. As offset opportunity costs rise and domestic mitigation efforts 
become cost competitive, the demand for carbon offsets will decrease as there are more cost-
effective options. The combination of stringent targets and higher opportunity costs in later years 
reduces the likelihood for carbon offsets to address long-term price uncertainties effectively. 
Therefore, carbon offsets are likely to be more effective at containing start-up and short-term 
cost uncertainties, as long-term uncertainties are likely to persist due to stringent targets and 
higher opportunity costs.  
 
Since carbon offsets reduce expected costs, it can delay domestic abatement efforts like clean 
energy and technology investments and can weaken consumer price signals to reduce energy 
consumption. These concerns are often translated into offset purchasing restrictions, such as the 
two billion metric ton CO2 offset restriction in Waxman-Markey. These offset purchasing 
restrictions make offsets scarcer regionally; therefore, these restrictions can significantly reduce 
the cost-containment effectiveness of offsets as demonstrated in the results in Chapter 5. 
Alternatively, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a US Northeast and Mid-Atlantic 
State GHG reduction initiative, incorporates offsets as a sort of allowance reserve mechanism, 
where more offsets are allowed to enter the market when the trigger price is exceeded. RGGI 
initially limits offsets to 3.3% of a unit‘s total compliance obligation during a control period. If 
carbon prices exceed $7 (2005 dollars), allowed offsets increase to 5 percent, and if prices 
exceed $10 (2005 dollars), allowed offsets increase to 10 percent. This allows carbon offsets to 
primarily function as a cost-containment instrument for high carbon prices. The effectiveness of 
this mechanism is highly dependent on the allocated trigger price; low trigger price essentially 
allows carbon offsets to be available often, and an unrealistically high trigger price may never 
allow additional offsets to enter the market. These restrictions may deal with the concerns of low 
expected costs, but this can simultaneously reduce the supply of offsets, reducing participation 
from developing nations and possibly delaying necessary funding to developing countries. These 
purchasing restrictions significantly limit cost-containment for all three types of cost-
uncertainties, since demand is limited for all years.  
 
Start-up cost containment is heavily impacted by offset purchasing restrictions and supply 
uncertainties. If start-up cost uncertainties are particularly troublesome, supplementing offsets 
with another cost-containment instrument and/or delaying offset purchasing restrictions to later 
years may provide some relief. 
 
Moreover, as more countries allow carbon offsets into their respective trading schemes, 
competition for carbon offsets can make offsets scarcer. The European Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS), which is the largest trading scheme in operation, has offset restrictions; these 
restrictions can have a significant effect on the supply of carbon offsets to other countries. EU 
ETS limits carbon offsets to non-forestry activities, and according to the draft amendment of the 
EU ETS Directive, it is likely to be excluded post-Kyoto (Streck et al., 2009). Under this 
scenario, a surplus of REDD allowances could exist for to non-European Union countries, which 
would provide substantial cost savings and reduced risk of upside carbon price uncertainties for 
non-European Union countries. However, competitiveness effects are significantly mitigated by 
supply uncertainties and domestic offset purchasing restrictions. Therefore, competition over 
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offsets will likely play a minor role compared to regional offset purchasing restrictions and target 
stringency. 
 
Linking emission trading schemes is an attractive option as it helps lower expected costs by 
taking advantage of lower abatement options among developed nations with emission 
commitments. However, flexibility mechanisms, such as cost-containment instruments, can 
complicate the linkage between trading schemes with divergent mechanisms. For example, 
linking a US emissions trading scheme that accepts forestry credits with EU ETS can weaken EU 
ETS restrictions on forestry credits; it would make forestry credits available in EU ETS thus 
weakening EU restrictions. One way to address these concerns is to filter out incompatible 
carbon offsets from the linked systems; this requires a comprehensive tracking system with 
strong enforcement mechanisms to ensure that these offsets do not enter non-compliant trading 
schemes, which will raise the transaction costs of the entire system. 
 
For REDD, non-permanence further complicates linkage. Emission reductions from REDD may 
be subjected to non-permanence from events such as forest fires. As a result, someone needs to 
be responsible for maintaining permanence by restoring the released carbon. The designated 
party liable for non-permanence plays a significant role in linked schemes. If the producer of 
offsets is liable for non-permanence, linking is easy, provided that the trading systems to be 
linked have consistent accounting and verification rules. However, if buyers are liable for non-
permanence, linking is complicated, especially when certain schemes do not allow REDD 
offsets, as in EU ETS (Streck et al., 2009). Trading schemes with REDD restrictions will be less 
inclined to link, but if they are linked, there must be provisions to track REDD credits to ensure 
they are not traded with EU ETS. Even if both linked schemes accept REDD offsets, the means 
of restoration needs to be subjected to verification, and each linked scheme should have standard 
rules and enforcement capacity to ensure that integrity is maintained. In both cases of linked 
systems, consistent standards are necessary as lax rules in one scheme can drive laxity 
throughout the entire linked system thus weakening all other schemes (Streck et al., 2009). In 
both cases, developed countries will need to work closely with offset producers to ensure and 
develop consistent standards, especially in the case when the producer is responsible for 
permanence. 
 
Due to inherent supply uncertainties in carbon offsets, supplementing carbon offsets with other 
cost-containment instruments is recommended. In many cases, carbon offsets are not 
differentiated from domestic allowances and thus allowed to be banked as in the Waxman-
Markey Bill. Similar to banking of allowances, banking offsets add intertemporal flexibility to 
the use of offsets; regions and sectors can defer the use of offsets for future years when targets 
are stricter and abatement costs are higher. Allowing the banking of offsets can be used to 
address longer term price uncertainties. However, banking offsets may increase the demand for 
offsets as participants in schemes that allow banking may result in purchasing additional offsets 
to bank thereby increasing offset scarcity for the years when banking is exercised. This increase 
in demand can disrupt supply for other regions. Therefore, during the years when banking is 
exercised, cost savings from REDD may be reduced as banking can make offsets globally scarce. 
In addition, since carbon offsets could delay domestic abatement efforts, banking carbon offsets 
may further delay abatement efforts as these banked offsets introduce additional low cost 
abatement options in future years, displacing and delaying the otherwise adopted domestic 
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mitigation options. However, banking limitation provisions can be added to emissions trading 
schemes to restrict how long a permit can be banked. In Waxman-Markey, there are proposed 
expiration dates for offsets, which is a method to address these concerns. However, the 
effectiveness of banking as a supplemental instrument can be significantly limited by restrictions 
on offset purchases as these restrictions alone place significant limitations on cost-containment 
based on results in Chapter 5. 
 
For REDD, non-permanence issues can also complicate banking. REDD offsets would need to 
be tracked and monitored to ensure that offsets are restored appropriately. In addition, if a REDD 
offset needs to be restored in a future year, the restored offset may need to be discounted 
depending on when the non-permanence occurs. The Waxman-Markey Bill allows borrowing 
allowances with interest (8 percent per year); this interest rate or similar can be applied to 
permanence activities. On the other hand, if the responsibility of permanence is on the producer 
of the REDD offset, then these permanence details need to be accounted for by the producer.  
 
Carbon offsets are attractive for industrialized countries since they are generally cheaper than 
domestic abatement options. However, implementing carbon offsets requires additional 
administrative support that can add costs. For example, tracking and monitoring carbon offsets to 
ensure integrity within linked systems and within a scheme, especially in the case of banking and 
non-permanence, can add transaction and administrative costs. The extent of costs depends on 
who is liable for non-permanence and inconsistencies between linked systems that need to be 
addressed. However, liability for non-permanence may not make a difference, if producer 
liability costs are internalized in carbon offset opportunity costs. 
 
This mechanism is just a temporary solution for price uncertainties, as these low cost carbon 
offsets will eventually be exhausted and price uncertainties are likely to persist. However, unlike 
more common cost-containment instruments, it does incentivize further involvement of 
developing countries, which is necessary for large GHG reductions in the future, by funding 
abatement projects via carbon offsets; these projects promote sustainable development hopefully 
paving the way for real GHG emission reduction commitments from developing countries in the 
near future.  
 
In the end, increased use of carbon offsets to leverage cost-containment effects may be a mixed 
blessing for developing countries. Carbon offsets can provide the necessary support to move 
towards a more sustainable development path; however, when these developing countries move 
towards actual emission reduction commitments, these low cost abatement options will likely be 
exhausted. Therefore, there may be some equity concerns over abatement efforts as these 
developed nations enter into agreements, which may result in restricted output of carbon offsets 
to retain some of these options for the future. These supply restrictions will likely affect the cost-
containment effectiveness of carbon offsets. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, I investigated whether carbon offsets can reduce carbon price uncertainties, 
specifically upside carbon prices. Because offset scarcity from changes in the demand for and 
supply of offsets can impact cost containment effectiveness; I examined the following supply 
and demand offset restriction scenarios on costs: (1) increasing competition over offset demand; 
(2) offset purchasing restrictions, and (3) supply uncertainties. Using REDD as a case study 
example, I analyzed these scenarios on REDD offsets in the EPPA model both deterministically 
and stochastically.  
 
The results confirm that REDD lowers expected costs and more importantly reduces upside 
costs. Carbon prices at the 99
th
 percentile were found to have at least a 51 percent reduction from 
the ‗No REDD‘ reference case. Increasing competition over the demand reduces the cost savings 
from REDD, although the effect of competition is less pronounced in later years since emission 
targets are more stringent in later years. In addition, US offset purchasing restrictions 
substantially reduce cost containing effectiveness especially in the early years. Supply 
uncertainties also reduce effectiveness but less than the US offset purchasing restriction. 
Moreover, competition effects are muted in the presence of US offset purchasing restrictions and 
supply uncertainties as these restrictions impact offset scarcity more than from competition. 
Considering supply uncertainties and offset restrictions reduce effectiveness in the early years 
and the combination of stringent targets and increasing offset opportunity costs in later years, 
carbon offsets may be more effective at addressing short-term cost uncertainties. 
 
Supplementing carbon offsets with another cost-containment instrument, such as banking, may 
help address scarcity concerns and help address longer term cost uncertainties. On the other 
hand, supplemental instruments may raise concerns about further delaying domestic action. In 
addition, offset purchasing restrictions can reduce the effectiveness of additional cost-
containment instruments as offset scarcity can limit the amount of offsets that can be banked. 
 
Carbon offsets can serve as an important cost-containment instrument that has the added benefit 
of encouraging participation by developing nations through the support of sustainable 
development activities in these developing nations. The demand for carbon offsets as a cost 
containment instrument would encourage efforts to further expand the availability of more 
offsets, like REDD, thereby further promoting the development and deployment of REDD 
offsets. The inclusion of REDD credits in emissions trading schemes could provide the necessary 
financial transfers to developing nations to substantially curb deforestation.  However, offsets 
restrictions in current and proposed legislations can significantly reduce magnitude of these 
financial transfers.  
 
Furthermore, incorporating carbon offsets to a trading scheme can add complications in linked 
systems. For example, forestry offsets are not permitted in the EU ETS; therefore, linked 
schemes need to be vigilant that these offsets do not leak into EU ETS thereby weakening EU 
restrictions. In addition, ensuring permanence for REDD offsets will require standard rules and 
verification methods to maintain integrity; these measures to ensure system integrity will add 
transaction and administrative costs. Moreover, equity concerns from developing nations, that 
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low cost abatement options will be exhausted when they commit to actual emission reductions, 
may result in offset supply restrictions, which can also affect cost-containment. 
7.1 Future Work 
Banking is a good supplemental instrument to carbon offsets as it can add inter-year flexibility 
on the use of offsets; in fact, Waxman-Markey Bill allows the banking of offsets. In my model, 
carbon offsets were bought and consumed at the same time; there was no re-trading or banking. 
It would be interesting to simulate banking of offsets to understand the effects of banking on 
cost-effectiveness. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, RGGI uses offsets as an allowance reserve instrument, where if the 
trigger price is exceeded, more offsets are allowed to enter the system. It would be interesting to 
analyze carbon offsets as an allowance reserve, with a sensitivity analysis on different allowance 
reserve restrictions, such as trigger prices and offset quantities allowed. This can be compared to 
the results from the US Waxman-Markey 1bmt international offset restriction. 
 
For my initial REDD supply, I assumed that the maximum available REDD was where the costs 
went vertical. It would be more realistic to insert the REDD MAC curves in EPPA, such that 
REDD supply was determined by equating marginal costs between EPPA‘s MAC and REDD 
MAC. This may involve linking forestry models, like GTM, with a forward-looking EPPA 
model. The two models may need to run concurrently as the GTM model will need account for 
the forestry abatement options exercised in the EPPA model, and the EPPA model will need 
abatement costs from the GTM model to determine the share of abatement activity from the 
forestry sector.  Alternatively, forestry assumptions can be added into the EPPA model to 
account for available forestry abatement opportunities.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure A1. Marginal Costs of emission reductions from avoided deforestation activities in 2010 in three regions from 
three models (Kindermann et al., 2008) 
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Figure A2. Marginal Costs of emission reductions from avoided deforestation activities in 2030 in three regions from 
three models (Kindermann et al., 2008) 
 
 
 
Figure A3. Carbon Price vs. Median REDD Acquired by US (China) in 2020 
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Figure A4. Carbon Price vs. Median REDD Acquired by US for Fast Supply Scenarios (2030, 2040, 2050) 
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Figure A5. Carbon Price vs. Median REDD Acquired by US for Fast Supply Scenarios (2030, 2040, 2050) 
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Figure A6. Median Carbon Prices for different trading scenarios and percent reduction from 'No REDD' Reference Case 
(Fast Supply Uncertainty Scenario) 
 
 
Figure A7. Carbon Prices at 95th percentile for different trading scenarios and percent reduction from 'No REDD' 
Reference Case (Fast Supply Uncertainty Scenario) 
 
 
Figure A8. Carbon Prices at 99th percentile for different trading scenarios and percent reduction from 'No REDD' 
Reference Case (Fast Supply Uncertainty Scenario) 
 
 
 
 
